Governance · 7 min read · Aug 12, 2026

Governance that someone will use.

Most AI governance material is written for organisations with a compliance function, a legal team and time. If you have none of those, the realistic choice is not between good governance and light governance — it is between light governance and none. Here is the light version that still works.

What governance is actually for

Strip away the framework language and governance answers three questions: what are we using, what could go wrong, and who decides. Everything else is machinery for producing those answers repeatedly. A small organisation can answer all three on a few pages, and a few pages that get read beat a policy document that does not.

Start with an inventory, because you do not have one

Nearly every organisation underestimates its own AI usage, because the estimate counts procured systems and the reality includes everything staff adopted on their own. Before writing any policy, find out what is actually in use.

Four columns is enough: what the tool is, who uses it, what data goes into it, and what happens if the output is wrong. That last column is what turns a list into a risk register, and it is the one people skip.

You cannot govern what you have not found. Governance written before an inventory governs the tools you knew about, which are not the risky ones.

Tier by consequence, not by technology

The instinct is to classify by how advanced the system is. That produces heavy process around impressive-looking tools and none around a spreadsheet macro that decides something important. Classify by what happens when it is wrong.

TierTestWhat it needs
LowWrong output wastes some timeNothing beyond the basic rules
MediumWrong output reaches a customerHuman review before it leaves
HighAffects money, employment, safety, legal standingDocumented process, named owner, audit trail
Three tiers by consequence of a wrong output: low risk wastes time and needs only basic rules, medium risk reaches a customer and needs human review, high risk affects money, employment, safety or legal standing and needs a documented process, named owner and audit trail.
Tier by what a wrong answer costs, not by how advanced the tool looks.

This mirrors how risk-based AI regulation is structured — obligations scale with the consequence of the decision, with the heaviest requirements reserved for uses that affect people's rights or livelihoods. Tiering by consequence means that if formal obligations do reach you later, you are already sorted into the right buckets rather than starting over.

Four rules people will actually follow

A policy nobody remembers is decoration. Four rules, stated plainly, get followed:

  • Say when it was AI. Anything going to a customer or into a decision record is labelled as AI-assisted.
  • Don't paste what you wouldn't email. Client data, credentials and personal records do not go into unapproved tools.
  • A person signs off anything that leaves. Review before it reaches a customer, a regulator or a public channel — and the reviewer is accountable for it.
  • Log the high-tier ones. For anything in the top tier, keep what went in, what came out, and who approved it.

Notice what is absent: no approved-model list to maintain, no committee, no request form. Those are the parts that decay first in an organisation without someone whose job is to maintain them, and their decay is what discredits the rest.

Shadow usage is a supply problem

The reflex response to unapproved tool use is prohibition. It rarely works, because the behaviour has a cause: the sanctioned option is slower, worse, or does not exist. Prohibition without a supplied alternative moves the usage out of sight, which makes it more dangerous rather than less.

Providing a sanctioned path quickly is a data-protection measure, not a productivity perk. The organisations with the least shadow usage are generally the ones that shipped something usable early, not the ones with the strictest policy.

Two reviews, quarterly, an hour each

Governance decays without a rhythm, and the rhythm can be very light. Once a quarter: refresh the inventory — what appeared, what stopped being used — and re-check the tiering of anything whose scope changed, because systems that start as drafting assistants quietly become decision-makers.

A quarterly loop in four steps: refresh the inventory, re-tier anything whose scope changed, re-test high-tier systems after a model change, and record what moved. The re-test step is highlighted as the one most often skipped.
About an hour a quarter. The third step is the one almost nobody runs.

One more thing worth doing at the same interval and almost nobody does: re-test your high-tier systems after any model change. Behaviour shifts on upgrade, and a system validated against the previous version has not been validated. That single check catches more real problems than any amount of policy writing.

Dealing with this in your own group?

We answer scoping questions before there's a contract in sight — including the ones about cost and data handling.

Questions

Short answers,
in full.

The questions this article gets asked most, answered so each one stands on its own.

Talk to us
How do we govern AI without a compliance team?

Answer three questions on a few pages: what are we using, what could go wrong, and who decides. Start with an inventory of actual usage including tools staff adopted themselves, tier each use by the consequence of a wrong output, and apply a small number of rules people can remember. Machinery that needs a maintainer will decay if you do not have one.

How should we classify AI risk?

By consequence, not by how advanced the technology is. Low risk wastes time; medium risk reaches a customer and needs human review; high risk affects money, employment, safety or legal standing and needs a documented process, a named owner and an audit trail. This matches how risk-based AI regulation is structured, so the sorting still holds if formal obligations reach you later.

How do we stop staff using unapproved AI tools?

Treat it as a supply problem rather than a discipline problem. Unapproved usage happens because the sanctioned option is slower, worse or absent, and prohibition without an alternative moves it out of sight where it is more dangerous. Shipping a usable internal option quickly reduces shadow usage more reliably than policy does.

How often should AI systems be reviewed?

Quarterly is enough for most organisations, at about an hour: refresh the inventory and re-check the tiering of anything whose scope has changed, since drafting assistants quietly become decision-makers. Separately, re-test high-tier systems after any model change — behaviour shifts on upgrade, and a system validated against the previous version has not been validated.